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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM VERSUS
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: REFLECTIONS
FROM HISTORY
Robert J. Kaczorowski*
INTRODUCTION
The titles of Larry Kramer's and Larry Sager's2 books suggest that
their contents are very similar. Actually, the books present
diametrically opposite theories of American constitutionalism that
happen to share some commonalities. This Essay will highlight the
books' essential differences and comment on their theories from my
perspective as a constitutional historian.
As his title indicates, Sager presents a theory of constitutional
practice. By this, I understand him to mean that he aims to explain
how the Constitution has been interpreted and who should have the
final authority to interpret it. As to the first question, Sager believes
that the American constitutional system is directed at "bringing our
political community into better conformity with fundamental
requirements of political justice."3  Thus, he labels his theory the
"justice-seeking account" of constitutional practice.4 As to the second
question, regarding who should have the final authority to interpret
the Constitution, Sager argues that, in most cases, judges have
exercised, and should exercise, the final authority to interpret the
Constitution5 for at least three reasons.
The first reason is that judges are independent of the political
partisanship inherent in the other institutions within the constitutional
political system. They are therefore institutionally best suited to
exercise "independent normative judgment[s]" on constitutional
questions.6
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (2004).
2. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice (2004).
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 5.
6. Id.
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The second reason is that "Constitutional judges are partners [with
the founders] rather than agents [in constitution formation], and are
expected to do much of the heavy normative lifting in the course of
bringing detail to the abstract generalities of the liberty-bearing
portions of the Constitution. '7  Sager is unclear about whose
expectations he refers to in the preceding quote. Also, Sager argues,
judges are "partners" with, rather than "agents" of, the framers
because of the impossibility of ascertaining the intent of the framers
regarding substantive questions of constitutional law.8 It is thus
implausible for judges to be agents as they cannot turn to the framers
for instructions on how to decide contemporary substantive issues of
constitutional law. Cut off from the framers, the "conscientious
judge" must "exercise her own normative judgment" to maintain
fidelity to the Constitution.9 Sager argues that even Larry Lessig's
theory of constitutional translation and Bruce Ackerman's theory of
constitutional amendment, which he says are predicated upon "a
basal, unmitigated commitment to agency in principle," 10 inevitably
depend upon judges to exercise "independent normative judgment to
some extent"11 and therefore require the "normative independence"
of judges in interpreting ambiguous constitutional texts.12
Sager argues that the third reason judges should exercise
independent normative judgment is because this most accurately
describes what judges have actually been doing since the founding.13
Actual constitutional practice, Sager insists, "involves at its core a
collaboration between the framing generations... and those who
undertake to apply the precepts named in the text to concrete
issues."' 4 This collaboration entails independent normative judgment
by both the framers and judges.
Sager's theory becomes paradoxical at this point. He attributes this
constitutional design to the framers themselves when he observes that
they could have created a constitutional text "in gritty detail rather
than moral generality." 5 He uses this observation to argue that the
framers "depended upon the collaboration of those who would be
responsible for implementing the broad values invoked in the
Constitution's text." 6  For Sager's "justice-seeking account" of
constitutional theory, the "transtemporal partnership at the heart of
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Id. at 63.
10. Id. at 64-65.
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 64-65.
13. Id. at 71.
14. Id. at 66.
15. Id. at 67.
16. Id.
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our constitutional practice"' 17 must be between the framers and judges.
Because "the heart of the social project of constitutional justice is the
impartiality and generality of the moral perspective,"' 8 in his view,
judges inherently have this quality, and they act on it much better than
regularly elected public officials. 9
There is another paradox, which left me confused. Having argued
that judges are best-suited to implement the justice-seeking
Constitution, Sager then affirms the idea of "judicial
underenforcement" of constitutional norms.2 0  He says that "the
Constitution is broader than judicially articulated constitutional law,
and that nonjudicial political actors have a corresponding obligation
to interpret and respect the Constitution to its outermost margins."'" I
do not see in Sager's analysis an explanation of why the Court does
not, or cannot, fully enforce all constitutional norms, or why the Court
is less fit than our "popular political institutions""2 to enforce norms
that he says are underenforced by the Supreme Court. He simply
argues that the underenforcement thesis most accurately fits current
constitutional practice, and that this shows that there are certain
directions the Court should have taken in expanding constitutional
justice (such as in the area of social welfare), which it did not. 3 But I
am left wondering why the Court failed in these areas, and how one
can know that the Court in fact failed.
Larry Kramer's theory of American constitutionalism, like Sager's,
is predicated on an assumption about the necessity for continuing
implementation of constitutional values and precepts.2 4 Kramer
argues, however, that it is the people themselves, rather than judges,
who are to perform this continuing adaptation and implementation of
constitutional principles.2 5 He derives his theory from constitutional
and political history, and portrays a constitutional practice that is
directly contradictory to Sager's.
Kramer argues that today's judicial supremacists, such as Sager, are
wrong when they insist that the Supreme Court has been the final
authority in interpreting the Constitution, and that the Court has
imposed its interpretation on the other branches of the federal
government and on the states throughout most of the nation's
history. 6 Kramer asserts that judicial supremacy may have surfaced
as a theory of judicial review among a few Federalists at the nation's
17. Id. at 76.
18. Id. at 73 (internal citation omitted).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 7, 93.
21. Id. at 94.
22. Id. at 6-7.
23. Id. at 94-95.
24. See generally Kramer, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 247-48.
26. Id. at 208.
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founding, but it was not widely accepted until the Supreme Court's
1958 decision in Cooper v. Aaron." It was during the Warren Court
era that "the principle of judicial supremacy came to monopolize
constitutional theory and discourse," at least in the area of
constitutionally secured individual rights.28 The Court remained
deferential to Congress in other areas of constitutional law.29
Kramer argues that the judicial activism of the Rehnquist Court
(which claims that the Court is the final authority in all questions of
constitutional law) is anomalous, and this deeply troubles him.3"
Whereas the activism of the Warren Court expanded constitutional
protections of individual rights, which Kramer applauds, the
Rehnquist Court's activism has abandoned "doctrines and principles
that served after 1937 to limit the Court's authority," and has asserted
final authority to interpret the whole Constitution, not just those
provisions protecting individual rights.31 Kramer disapproves of the
Rehnquist Court's decisions and rejects the judicial supremacy that
Sager argues is essential to his justice-seeking constitutionalism.
Kramer insists that "the people themselves" are the legitimate final
authority in matters of fundamental law.32
Kramer's book, among other things, is a rebuttal to the Rehnquist
Court's theory and practice of judicial supremacy. This theory is
predicated on the Court's understanding of original intent and judicial
precedent, summarized by Kramer through Chief Justice Rehnquist's
proclamation that the framers of the Constitution intended the federal
judiciary's supremacy in interpreting the Constitution to be a
"permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."33
The Chief Justice acknowledged that Congress and the President
"have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever
since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text."34 Kramer rejects Rehnquist's understanding of
history and of judicial supremacy, and he presents a corrective to
both.35
Kramer's book is an original and important study of constitutional,
political, and intellectual history. The core of Kramer's book views
27. Id. at 221; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
28. Kramer, supra note 1, at 224.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 225-26.
31. Id. at 225.
32. See id. at 8.
33. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000)
(internal citation omitted)).
34. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that Marbury established judicial
supremacy by proclaiming that the Supreme Court had the final authority in saying
what the Constitution means was first asserted in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1958).
35. Kramer, supra note 1, at 226 (describing Kramer's theory and practice of
popular constitutionalism).
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the Constitution as having been created by the people of the United
States, and he argues that it remains "fundamentally, an act of popular
will."36 The founders did not delegate to the judiciary the authority to
enforce the Constitution against the other branches of the federal
government.37 Rather, they reserved final authority to interpret the
Constitution to the political branches of the government, subject to
the people's oversight through elections and extra-legal means.38
Kramer observes, for example, that President James Madison, who
had opposed the congressional act chartering the Bank of the United
States in 1791 because he believed it was unconstitutional, refused to
veto the Second National Bank bill in 1816 on constitutional
grounds.39  Although Madison still believed that the bill was
unconstitutional, he also believed that the issue of the bank's
constitutionality had been established by the "repeated recognitions"
of its validity by acts of the three branches of the United States
government and by "the general will of the nation."40 Acquiescing to
the people's will, Madison signed the second bank bill into law.41
Kramer informs us that political parties emerged in the nineteenth
century as institutions through which the people expressed their will
on constitutional questions and exercised control over the government
without resorting to violence or other extra-legal acts of resistance.42
Parties absorbed popular politics and became essential to making the
Constitution work.43 The political will of the people even accounts for
judicial review, which arose because judges were prohibited from
enforcing an unconstitutional law, just as legislators were prohibited
from enacting unconstitutional laws and executives were prohibited
from administering unconstitutional statutes.44 But, when judges
refused to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds, they were not
performing "an act of ordinary legal interpretation. '4  Rather,
"judges were exercising the people's authority to resist, providing a
supplemental remedy for ultra vires legislative acts that averted the
need to mobilize popular opposition.
46
36. Id. at 7.
37. See id. at 58-59.
38. Id. at 53, 59.
39. Id. at 48-49.
40. Id. (quoting President Madison). Chief Justice John Marshall, in his opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland, recognized the authority of the people and of the political
branches of government to interpret the Constitution when he endorsed political
practice as a method of interpreting the Constitution, recounting that this had led to
Madison's acquiescence to the bank bill. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819).
41. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 48-49.
42. Id. at 165.
43. Id. at 162-73.
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id.
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Consequently, Kramer argues that judicial review "was a political-
perhaps we should say a 'political-legal'- act of resistance.
47
Moreover, proponents of judicial review limited this power to statutes
that were unquestionably unconstitutional. 48  As Kramer explains,
"U]udicial review was a substitute for popular action, a device to
maintain popular sovereignty without the need for civil unrest."49
Judges' decisions about the Constitution, like those of other officials,
''were still subject to oversight and ultimate resolution by the people
themselves."5  Departmental judicial review reflected the
predominant understanding of the Court's power to interpret the
Constitution up to the Civil War.5
According to Kramer's account, the shift toward judicial supremacy
in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence began between 1865 and 1905.52
A struggle ensued between advocates of judicial supremacy and those
of popular constitutionalism, culminating with the latter's victory in
the 1930s.11 Progressivism and the New Deal represented a "golden
age for popular constitutionalism" in which reformers worked "to
reinvigorate and restore popular control of government and the
Constitution."54  Those reformers sought to make lawmakers and
policy makers more accountable to the public and to make the people
the ultimate authority over issues of social welfare and public policy.
55
The New Deal Court assumed the limited role of enforcing the Bill
of Rights.56 It deferred to Congress and to the President in other
matters of public policy, leaving to Congress's discretion questions
relating to its enumerated powers.57 The Court became active in
protecting individual rights and minority rights in the middle of the
twentieth century." Still, the idea of judicial supremacy was not
widely accepted until 1958, when the Court asserted its ultimate
authority to interpret the Constitution in Cooper v. Aaron.59
A majority of the American public today believes that the Supreme
Court should have the final authority to interpret the Constitution.' °
In light of history, Kramer argues, the current acceptance of judicial
supremacy "is exceedingly anomalous." 61  The practice of judicial
47. Id.
48. Id. at 99.
49. Id. at 98-99.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id. at 210-13.
52. Id. at 213.
53. Id. at 220.
54. Id. at 215.
55. Id. at 215-16.
56. Id. at 219-20.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 221.
60. Kramer, supra note 1, at 232.
61. Id. at 233.
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supremacy takes control over fundamental law away from the people
and turns it over to "a judicial oligarchy. 6 2 Consequently, Kramer
contends that advocates of judicial supremacy are anti-democratic
elites who believe "that popular politics is by nature dangerous and
arbitrary; that 'tyranny of the majority' is a pervasive threat; that a
democratic constitutional order is therefore precarious and highly
vulnerable; and that substantial checks on politics are necessary lest
things fall apart."63 Kramer sees the current debate regarding judicial
supremacy as the same debate over the question of how to control an
excess of democracy or popular rule that arose at the founding and
again during the middle of the nineteenth century. 64 It is a debate
between democracy and aristocracy, and aristocracy is currently
61winning.
I. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Kramer and Sager present opposing views on two issues: first,
whether the prevailing constitutional practice of this nation has been
judicial supremacy or popular constitutionalism; and second, whether
popular constitutionalism or judicial supremacy is better suited to
fulfill the promise of democratic government and constitutional
justice. I will offer my views on these issues from the perspective of
history.
The best historical scholarship argues that the framers of the
Constitution drafted a document of general principles and structures
which they expected to be defined and applied to changing
circumstances. 66 Chief Justice Marshall asserted this understanding
and attributed it to the nature and text of the Constitution and to the
intent of the framers. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall stated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature,
therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the
American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of
62. Id. at 234 (quoting Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of
Political Parties in the United States 376 (1867)).
63. Id. at 243.
64. Id. at 246-48.
65. Id.
66. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 7-11 (1996); Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65
Fordham L. Rev, 1627, 1638 (1997); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to
It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587, 1608-09 (1997).
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the instrument, but from the language.... In considering this
question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.
67
Having described the special nature of a constitution as marking the
"outlines" and "objects" of government, Marshall stated that the
framers delegated to Congress, not to the Supreme Court, the
responsibility of adapting the Constitution to changing circumstances.
He said that the framers of the Constitution must have intended
Congress to implement the general principles of the Constitution,
because it was to Congress that the Constitution entrusts "those great
powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends.,
68
Marshall maintained that Congress must possess "the capacity to avail
itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its
legislation to [changing] circumstances" and thus enable the
Constitution "to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.,69
Marshall also suggested that, on doubtful questions of
constitutionality, political practice "ought to receive a considerable
impression," if not decisive weight.7y However, the Chief Justice
67. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
68. Id. at 415. Marshall's full statement, from which this account quotes, is as
follows:
It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as
far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could
not be done, by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to
leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate,
and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a
constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the
means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers,
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and
give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To
have declared, that the best means shall not be used, but those alone,
without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to
deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise
its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.
Id.
69. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
70. Id. Marshall endorsed political practice as a legitimate method of interpreting
and adapting the Constitution to changing circumstances. The Court has endorsed
this method in other cases. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-35
(1997); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569 (1996); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
621 (1842); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 304 (1803). In Prigg, the Court
used political practice to justify an expansion of Congress's legislative powers. 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) at 622. Justice Scalia applied the same reasoning to curtail Congress's power
to direct state executive officers to perform federal functions in Printz. 521 U.S. at
926-35. Justice Scalia also invoked a kind of political practice in dissent in United
States v. Virginia to narrow the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in
a sex discrimination case. 518 U.S. at 569. Concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
[Vol. 731422
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appears to have excepted from this method of constitutional
interpretation issues involving "the great principles of liberty,"
applying it to those powers left to the discretion of Congress and the
executive."1 McCulloch thus extended Marshall's distinction between
issues that are left to the political branches and the political process
and those that are reserved to the courts, which he articulated in
Marbury v. Madison.2 There, Marshall asserted that where the
executive or Congress "possesses a constitutional or legal discretion
[to act], nothing can be more perfectly clear, than that their acts are
only politically examinable." 3 However, a question of vested rights
"is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority."74
The Court's responsibility, furthermore, is to remedy violations of
vested rights. The Chief Justice reiterated this principle, stating that
"[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion."75
Marshall posited a theory of limited judicial review under which the
Court was deferential to Congress. He asserted in Marbury that the
framers intended the courts to decide questions of constitutional law,
even to the extent of voiding an act of Congress. As examples of such
questions, Marshall cited acts that contravened plain meaning
provisions of the Constitution. 6 In McCulloch, Marshall recognized
that Congress possessed broad implied powers, powers implied not
only from those expressly delegated to it, but powers inherent in
Congress's sovereign nature.77 Moreover, Marshall expressly asserted
that the Court had the authority to void acts of Congress only if they
"are prohibited by the constitution" or were adopted for purposes
"not intrusted to the [federal] government."7 Indeed, Marshall used
Co., Justice Felix Frankfurter applied political practice in assessing implied executive
powers, arguing that "a systematic, unbroken executive practice long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned,... making as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss
on 'executive power' vested in the President by Section 1 of Article II." 343 U.S. at
610-11.
71. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). Professor William E. Nelson argues that
Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between political questions and questions of law,
and held the judiciary to decide only questions of law. William E. Nelson, Marbury v.
Madison (2000); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John
Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 893 (1978).
73. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
74. Id. at 167.
75. Id. at 170.
76. Id. at 179. Marshall referred to the Constitution's bar against state taxes on
exports, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the Constitution's requirements for
a conviction of treason. Id.
77. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History and to It: An Impossible Dream?, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1663, 1670-73 (1997).
78. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
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the Tenth Amendment as another source of his theory of broad
implied powers, citing it as authority for his presumption that
Congress possessed the power to legislate unless the Constitution
expressly prohibited Congress from acting.79
Justice Joseph Story embellished Marshall's theory of judicial
review in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.'0 He described the Court's power to
interpret the Constitution as a duty to carry out to their fullest extent
the principles and the objectives it expressed. Story asserted that "the
safest rule of interpretation" was "to look to the nature and objects of
the particular powers, duties and rights" expressed in the
Constitution, and, with the help "of contemporary history," to
interpret the text "as may fairly secure and attain the ends
proposed.""s He expressed this point more strongly when he stated
the Court had a duty to interpret the language of the Constitution "in
such a manner as, consistently with the words, shall fully and
completely effectuate the whole objects of it."82
Story asserted that the Court was obligated to interpret ambiguous
constitutional provisions in a manner that would best effectuate and
enforce its purposes. According to Story, "[n]o court of justice can be
authorized so to construe any clause of the constitution as to defeat its
obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the
words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them."83  Story
enunciated these principles in Prigg, which upheld Congress's power
to enforce a constitutional provision that did not explicitly delegate to
Congress the power to enforce it. 4 He also expressed these views in
his treatise on the Constitution.
79. Id. Relying in part on the language of the Tenth Amendment, Marshall
recognized Congress's broad implied powers and the limited scope of the Court's
power of judicial review, declaring that, "where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here
to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground." Id.
80. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610-11 (1842).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 612.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 539 (upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,
ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864), which Congress enacted to implement the Fugitive
Slave Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3).
85. I Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 383-
442 (Hilliard & Co. & Rothman & Co. eds., 1999) (1833); III id. at 109-26. Story
asserted that the intent of the framers of statutes and constitutions are binding, noting
that "the universal principle of interpretation" of statutes is "that the will and
intention of the legislature is to be regarded and followed," particularly "where
doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words" of a statute. I id. at 444. Where the
words "are clear and unambiguous, there seems little room for interpretation." Id.
He then applied this principle of statutory construction to judicial constitutional
interpretation: "There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or
constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of
the framers." Id.
1424 [Vol. 73
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It seems to be clear that Marshall and Story asserted theories of
constitutional construction, constitutional practice, and judicial review
that are closer to Kramer's theory than to Sager's. Congress was to
have the primary role in interpreting the Constitution and adapting it
to changing circumstances.86 Congress was to exercise sovereign
powers, both expressed and implied, that might be required by
practical exigencies confronting the nation, limited only by the
purposes, objects, and ends expressed in the Constitution.87 The
Court's power of judicial review required the Court to defer to and
enforce the will of Congress. It permitted the Court to declare
unconstitutional acts of Congress in very limited circumstances, where
Congress clearly exercised power that the Constitution prohibited, or
for objects, purposes, or ends that the Constitution did not provide.88
The wisdom or advisability of particular statutes was left to the
discretion of Congress, and the exercise of this discretion was part of
the legislative function. 9 The remedy for Congress's abuse of its
legislative powers was the will of the people expressed through the
political process.9" The remedy clearly did not reside in the federal
judiciary or the Supreme Court.9 Cases involving constitutional rights
were an exception to these rules.92 It appears that the Court had a
greater role to play in ensuring that constitutional rights were secured,
and not violated, by law.
Marshall's and Story's views of judicial review, which deferred to
Congress on issues of constitutional interpretation, were characteristic
of the Court before the Civil War. Although the Court did not refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of federal statutes, it struck down
only two of them in the first seventy years of its history.93 In both
cases, the Court acted in the interest of enforcing individual rights. In
Marbury, the Court ruled that the Executive violated the vested right
of the claimant to a judicial office, but ruled unconstitutional the
federal statute that would have authorized the Court to grant the
remedy because Congress exercised power prohibited to it by the
explicit language of the Constitution.94 In Dred Scott, the Court
declared the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional because it
violated the constitutionally protected property rights of slaveholders
86. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
93. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court struck down section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court declared
the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, although the 1820 statute had been
repealed by Congress about three years prior to the Court's decision. 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856); see Act of May 30,1854, ch. 59, § 14, 10 Stat. 277, 282-83.
94. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
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in their slaves.95 With these two exceptions, the Court interpreted the
Constitution as enhancing, rather than limiting, Congress's legislative
powers beyond those enumerated in Article I. However, the Court
exercised its power of judicial review more assertively in cases
involving state law.9 6 Indeed, it held very early in its history that it was
the final authority in interpreting the Constitution in cases involving
state laws that raise federal questions.97
Marshall's theory on Congress's role in constitutional adaptation
was apparently based on constitutional practice. After all, from its
inception, Congress had played the leading role in adapting the
Constitution to changing circumstances. David Currie has recounted
the many ways in which the early Congresses defined and adapted
ambiguous constitutional provisions and played a primary role in the
Constitution's formation.98 Perhaps the most famous example is
Congress's chartering of the Bank of the United States, whose
constitutionality the Marshall Court upheld in McCulloch v.
Maryland.9 9 Less well known is the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.'
II. CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 is notable because it was the first
statute Congress enacted to enforce a constitutional right. 10 1
Regrettably, the right enforced was the property right of slave holders
to recover their runaway slaves. Congress conferred on slave holders
three civil remedies to vindicate their constitutionally secured
property right. First, Congress authorized slave holders to seize their
runaway slaves and present them to a federal or state judge. On
satisfying the judge that the person presented was bound to the
master, the slave holders received a certificate of removal that
authorized them to return the runaway slaves from whence they
escaped. The other two remedies are more interesting: a civil fine of
$500 was recoverable from any person who assisted the slave to flee,
who harbored the fugitive slave, or who prevented his recapture; and
damages were recoverable from such persons by the master in an
action of tort.
95. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 393.
96. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
97. Id.
98. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-
1793, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 606, 606 (1996) [hereinafter, Currie, The Second Congress];
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 776-78 (1994).
99. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
100. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864).
101. Except where otherwise noted, the following account is taken from Robert J.
Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress's Power to Enforce Constitutional
Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 153,164-67 (2004).
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Equally significant is the fact that Congress enacted the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 to implement the Constitution's Fugitive Slave
Clause. 1 2 This provision, which the framers included in Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution, merely prohibited a state from
interfering with the slaveholder's right to the slave's service or labor
owed to him under the laws of another state from which the fugitive
slave had escaped.103 It also required that the fugitive be delivered up
to the master. 1°4
The Fugitive Slave Clause did not expressly delegate to Congress
the power to enforce it.0 5 Nevertheless, in 1842, the United States
Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to enact the Fugitive Slave
Act and to redress violations of constitutional rights with tort damages
and a civil fine.106 Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Joseph
Story found that the Court was obligated to interpret the Constitution
in the manner that would most fully enforce its provisions."7 The
Court unanimously affirmed that the prohibition against state
interference with the slave owner's right to the service or labor of the
fugitive slave, that is, the constitutional prohibition against state
action, constituted "a positive [and] unqualified" recognition of a
property "right on the part of the owner of the slave."'0 8 The Court
also unanimously held that the constitutional recognition of the slave
owner's property right delegated to Congress plenary power to
"afford a complete protection and guarantee to the right."'19
Moreover, inasmuch as the owner of this property right held it as
against other persons, Story reasoned, a proper means of enforcing
this right was by civil suit "against some other person." 0 Story
characterized this civil suit as a case or controversy arising under
Article III of the Constitution.' Article III therefore constituted
another source of congressional power to enforce this constitutionally
secured right of property.
102. The Fugitive Slave Clause provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
107. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
108. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612.
109. Id. at 616.
110. Id.
111. Id.;see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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In 1850, Congress acceded to the demands of southerners for a
stronger fugitive slave act. The Fugitive Slave Act of 185012 created
additional remedies and provided a federal enforcement structure to
safeguard the slaveholder's constitutional right. It authorized federal
judges to appoint United States Commissioners with the authority "to
exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this
act,"' 13 including the power to call out a posse comitatus when
necessary to ensure the faithful observance of the statute."4 The 1850
Act substituted criminal penalties of a fine and imprisonment for the
civil fine provided in the 1793 Act.'15 It also added another tort
remedy of statutory damages of $1000 for each slave who escaped,
recoverable in a federal tort action from anyone who assisted the slave
to get away." 6 To ensure that federal legal officers faithfully executed
the law, the Act imposed a fine of $1000 upon them, payable to the
claimant, should they fail faithfully to execute all warrants and
precepts issued under the Act. 1 7 The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 before the Civil
War.'18
The history of the Fugitive Slave Acts is representative of American
constitutionalism prior to the Civil War. Congress assumed a primary
role in interpreting its constitutional powers, and interpreted its
powers broadly. It exercised its legislative powers to enforce slave
owners' constitutionally secured property right in their slaves by
creating federal civil causes of action for damages recoverable from,
and federal punishments imposed upon, anyone who interfered with
the slave owners' constitutional right. Reflecting Marshall's and
Story's theory of judicial review, the Supreme Court deferred to
Congress, both with respect to its primary role in constitutional
interpretation and to Congress's interpretation of its legislative
powers. The Court interpreted Congress's power to enforce the slave
owner's constitutionally recognized property right as both plenary and
exclusive of the states.
The Republican-controlled Thirty-Eighth Congress repealed the
Fugitive Slave Acts during the Civil War.19 It also nullified the
Fugitive Slave Clause by proposing and securing the ratification of the
112. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864) (amending the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
113. Id. § 1.
114. Id. § 5, 9 Stat. at 462.
115. Id. § 7, 9 Stat. at 464.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 5, 9 Stat. at 462-63.
118. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858).
119. Act of June 28, 1964, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200; Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave
Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860, at 194-95 (1970);
Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-
1861, at 218 (1974); 3 Henry Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power
in America 395-402 (Negro Univs. Press 1969) (1877).
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Thirteenth Amendment, 121 which abolished slavery. Like the first
Congresses at the founding of the nation in the eighteenth century and
the Fifty-First Congress in the middle of the nineteenth century, the
Thirty-Eighth through the Forty-Second Congresses, during
Reconstruction, asserted the authority to declare Congress's powers
to enforce constitutional rights, and exercised this power. David
Currie's description of the First Congress as "practically a second
constitutional convention"'12' accurately describes the Reconstruction
Congresses because they actually revolutionized the Constitution by
drafting and ratifying constitutional amendments that secured civil
and political rights. The Reconstruction Congresses also radically
changed the federal government's relationship with states in their
corporate capacities, state officials, United States citizens, and all of
the inhabitants of the states. These Congresses assumed the primary
role in interpreting the constitutional guarantees of the
Reconstruction Amendments as well as what were Congress's powers
to enforce the rights secured by the Amendments through
legislation. 2 2 This is a dimension of the congressional leadership
model of constitutional change that Bruce Ackerman attributes to the
Reconstruction period.2 3
In recognition of the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Republican leaders of the Thirty-Ninth Congress declared in
December 1865 that one of the primary objectives of this Congress
was to implement the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee of freedom
to all Americans by defining and enforcing the fundamental rights
which belong to all free men. 24 They insisted that now that freedom
was constitutionally secured throughout the United States, Congress
surely must have as much constitutional authority to enforce the
fundamental liberties of all Americans as it earlier possessed to
enforce slavery, which had existed in only a part of the United
States.1 25 Using the Fugitive Slave Acts as their models, congressional
Republicans enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to remedy civil
rights violations and create a federal enforcement structure to ensure
that citizens' civil rights were protected. 26 Less than two months
later, Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment and sent it to the
120. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
121. Currie, The Second Congress, supra note 98, at 606.
122. I have elaborated on this interpretation of the revolutionary character of the
legislative actions of the Reconstruction Congresses in Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986).
123. See generally 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
124. Kaczorowski, supra note 101, at 228-29.
125. Id. at 212.
126. Except where otherwise noted, the following account is taken from Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Congress's Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons
from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. (forthcoming Feb.
2005).
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states for ratification. The framers and supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment stated repeatedly that they incorporated the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act into the Amendment, which they had enacted
weeks earlier, in order to prevent its possible repeal by a future
Congress, to incorporate its guarantees of civil rights into the
Constitution, and to remove any doubts about its constitutionality.
The provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 evince the minimum
scope of Congress's powers to enforce the rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment and to remedy their violation, at least as
understood by the framers. An examination of the statute is essential
to an understanding of the Amendment.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act defined, for the first time in the
nation's history, United States citizenship, and conferred citizenship
on all native born Americans, including African-Americans. 2
Congress-that is, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment-
exercised legislative authority to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in the Dred Scott case,'128 which held that African-Americans
were not and never could become United States citizens. They
asserted Congress's power to interpret the Constitution, and to
legislate to implement its interpretation, even over the Supreme
Court's contrary interpretation.129 Congress's action tends to support
Kramer's argument that judicial supremacy was not the predominant
view in the mid-nineteenth century.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act also defined some of the rights
individuals possessed as United States citizens. 3° It conferred these
rights in a way that preserved the states' concurrent jurisdiction over
civil rights, except that it removed the states' power to regulate the
enumerated civil rights on the basis of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."' Section I applied the model of congressional
enforcement of constitutional rights that earlier Congresses had
adopted in the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 to civil rights: it
conferred on United States citizens the right to sue civilly anyone who
127. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
128. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
129. Most Republicans argued that the Court had gotten its facts wrong in Dred
Scott, and thus Congress had the power to extend citizenship to African-Americans.
In addition-or for some, an alternative reason -supporters argued that slavery was
the disability that led the Court to disqualify African-Americans from United States
citizenship. This disability no longer disqualified African-Americans after the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. See Kaczorowski, supra note 126.
130. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
131. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that all citizens were to
enjoy the same right to make and enforce contracts, to acquire and dispose of
property, to sue and be sued, to give testimony in a court of law, and the same right to
the protection of the law and legal process to secure their personal safety and that of
their property as the most favored citizens enjoyed, that is, as white citizens enjoyed.
It also provided that citizens shall be subject to prosecution for the same crimes and,
on conviction, to the same penalties. Id.
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infringed any of the rights it secured.1 2 Section 2 of the Civil Rights
Act adapted the model of penal remedies adopted in the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 to civil rights: it imposed criminal penalties on
anyone who violated a citizen's section 1 rights while acting under
color of state law or custom because of racial animus.
133
Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act was an overlooked jurisdictional
section that included an unprecedented substitution of federal police
powers for state police powers. It contained three jurisdictional
provisions.13 The first echoed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on federal district courts to try all
causes arising under the 1866 statute.135 This included civil suits
brought to enforce section 1 rights and criminal prosecutions brought
under section 2. The third jurisdictional provision was a removal
provision which authorized any federal officer, civil or military,
against whom a civil suit or criminal prosecution was brought in any
state court for any wrongs alleged to have been done under color of
authority of the Civil Rights Act or the Freedmen's Bureau Act, or for
refusing to do an act inconsistent with this statute, to remove the
cause for trial in the proper federal district or circuit court. 136 It
extended the same removal right to any state official who was civilly
sued or criminally prosecuted for refusing to do an act inconsistent
with the Civil Rights Act.
The second jurisdictional provision is truly extraordinary. It
authorized federal district and circuit courts to try civil suits and
criminal prosecutions arising under state law whenever a party to the
cause was unable to enforce or was denied one of the rights secured in
section 1. For example, the federal district court in Kentucky tried
crimes from burglary to murder committed with impunity by whites
against black victims.'38 The federal jurisdictional predicate came
from the state's rules of evidence, which denied black Kentuckians the
right to testify in state courts in any case in which a white person was a
party, a right that was granted to white Kentuckians. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction to try
offenses arising under state criminal laws, but it interpreted the
132. The federal courts have consistently interpreted the Civil Rights Act as
securing the civil rights enumerated in section 1 from infringements by private parties.
See Kaczorowski, supra note 126; see, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481
U.S. 615 (1987); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
170-71 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1968); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22-23 (1883); In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No.
14,247).
133. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. at 27.
134. Id. at § 3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871).
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language of section 3 as limiting this jurisdiction only to criminal cases
in which blacks were defendants.1
39
Most of the remaining six sections of the Civil Rights Act were
copied from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.14 The framers adopted
the enforcement structure of the 1850 statute, giving federal judges
the authority to appoint United States commissioners to enforce the
1866 Act and to more effectively protect "all persons in their
constitutional rights of equality before the law."1 41 This statute was
enacted before the United States Constitution contained an explicit
guarantee of the right to the equal protection of the law. The Act
required federal officers, at the federal government's expense, "to
institute proceedings against all and every person who shall violate the
provisions of this act. ' 142 It imposed a duty on federal marshals and
deputy marshals to execute all warrants and process issued under the
statute "and to use all proper means diligently to execute the same.''4
Should they fail to do so, they were liable for a $1000 fine payable to
the person whose civil rights were violated.1" The Act also authorized
the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of
the United States and the state militia if necessary to enforce the Civil
Rights Act or to prevent its violation. 45
The presidential election of 1868 was tainted by fierce violence
committed by the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations in the
South. 146 The Klan functioned as a paramilitary wing of the
Democratic Party focused on eliminating the Republican Party from
the southern states and subjecting southern blacks to white social
control. 47 It used terror as a tactic, and the terrorism of the 1860s and
early 1870s was every bit as dangerous as that posed by al Qaeda
today. Congress again assumed primary responsibility to adapt the
Constitution to combat this terrorist threat. It responded, first, with
the Fifteenth Amendment, which secured to United States citizens the
right to vote in all elections without regard to race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, 148 and, second, with legislation aimed at
implementing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Congress enacted sweeping statutes in 1870 and 1871 to protect
southern blacks and white Republicans from Klan terrorism and to
enforce their constitutional rights by imposing civil liability and
139. Id. at 591-93; see also infra note 160 and accompanying text.
140. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. at 27.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 4, 14 Stat. at 28.
143. Id. § 5.
144. Id. § 6.
145. Id. § 9, 14 Stat. at 29.
146. The best history of Klan violence during Reconstruction is Allen W. Trelease,
White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (1971).
147. See generally id.
148. U.S. Const. amend. XV.
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criminal penalties on anyone who violated them. The Enforcement
Act of 1870149 was enacted primarily to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. The statute imposed civil liability and criminal penalties
against state and local election officials who interfered with or
prevented voters from exercising their Fifteenth Amendment right to
vote in any local, state, or federal election. It imposed similar civil
liability and criminal penalties against any person who, by bribery,
force, threats, or intimidation interfered with a citizen's right to vote
because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude. It also
imposed these penalties on anyone who violated a citizen's Fifteenth
Amendment right to vote by acts of economic intimidation, such as
refusing to renew a labor contract or a lease for land, or merely
threatening not to renew. Like the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this
statute adopted the enforcement structure of the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act.
The 1870 Enforcement Act also contained provisions that were
intended to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.150 It re-enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and extended its civil rights guarantees to
immigrant aliens. The 1870 Act made it a federal felony for two or
more individuals to conspire with the intention of depriving any other
person from exercising or enjoying "any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."'51
Anyone convicted of this felony was punishable by a fine of up to
$5000 or imprisonment for up to ten years, or both, at the court's
discretion, and disqualification from holding any office or place of
honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or federal law.
Another section provided for harsher penalties in cases where another
felony, crime, or misdemeanor under state law was committed. In
these cases, the punishment was to be the same "punishments as are
attached to the said felonies, crimes, and misdemeanors by the laws of
the State in which the offence may be committed." '52  Similar to
section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this section of the 1870 Act,
in effect, conferred on federal courts the authority to try offenses
against a state's criminal code if the offense was committed in the act
of violating the 1870 Act. 1
53
The 1871 "Ku Klux Klan Act" '154 was enacted primarily to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. It imposed civil liability against any
person who, acting under color of state law or custom, deprived, or
caused to be deprived, any person in the United States "of any rights,
149. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The remaining provisions of the 1870 Enforcement Act were directed at
preventing and punishing election fraud.
154. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States."'55 It adapted the civil liability and criminal penalties of prior
federal statutes and applied them to (1) conspiracies intended to
interfere with the operation of the federal government, federal law
enforcement, and judicial process; (2) conspiracies for the purpose of
denying to any person or class of persons the right to the equal
protection of the laws, equal privileges and immunities under the law,
the right to vote, or the right to advocate the election of candidates for
federal office; and (3) conspiracies to prevent state authorities from
securing to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law or the due course of justice with the intent of denying to any
person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws. Penalties
included a fine of from $500 to $5000 and/or imprisonment for not less
than six months nor more than six years, or both, as the court
determined.'56 The statute authorized the victims of such conspiracies
to sue the conspirators in tort to recover damages for any injuries
sustained or any right denied by any act done in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In an extraordinary "good Samaritan" rule, the 1871 Act
imposed third party tort liability on any person who could have
prevented, or could have aided in preventing, the wrongs just
mentioned but "neglect[ed] or refuse[d] so to do. ' 157 Such persons
were liable to the injured party for tort damages and, in the event of
the wrongful death of the injured party, such persons were liable to
the deceased's legal representatives for damages not to exceed
$5000. 158
The Reconstruction Congresses patterned the statutes they enacted
to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments against terrorists on older
statutes enacted to enforce constitutional rights that dated back to the
founding of the nation. Federal remedies included civil damages
recoverable by the injured party in federal tort actions brought against
private individuals and state officials who violated the claimant's
constitutional and statutory rights.'59 Reconstruction Congresses also
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Two other sections of this statute authorized the President to call out the
military and state militia in case of insurrection, domestic violence, or obstruction of
state or federal law enforcement that deprived "any portion or class of the people of
such State of any rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection named in the
Constitution and secured by this act," which state authorities were either unable to
protect or failed or refused to protect. Id. The statute deemed such failure of the
state authorities to offer protection as a denial of equal protection of the laws to
which all persons in the United States were entitled. Id. § 3, 17 Stat. at 14. Another
section authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus where
"unlawful combinations" were so numerous and powerful as to overthrow by violence
the constituted authorities of a state or where the state authorities "are in complicity
with, or shall connive at the unlawful purposes of, such powerful and armed
combinations." Id. § 4, 17 Stat. at 14-15.
159. See generally supra notes 102-17, 126-39, 149-58 and accompanying text.
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imposed federal criminal penalties on private individuals as well as
state officials who violated a person's constitutionally secured civil
and political rights.
Because President Andrew Johnson openly opposed the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, federal law enforcement officers were constrained
from enforcing the Act during the Johnson Administration.
Nevertheless, it was vigorously and extensively enforced in states such
as Kentucky. In Kentucky, United States Attorney Benjamin Helm
Bristow and United States District Judge Bland Ballard manifested a
strong commitment to bringing to justice white racists who committed
crimes against poor black victims with impunity under state law.
161
Policy constraints disappeared with the election of President Ulysses
S. Grant in 1868. With Attorney General Amos T. Akerman, Grant
exhibited an equally strong commitment to enforce the constitutional
rights of southern blacks and white Unionists against the depredations
of the Ku Klux Klan and similar terrorist organizations that cropped
up throughout the South.
161
Federal judges manifested an understanding of their role as
implementers of congressional will, and implemented congressional
understandings of the federal government's plenary power to enforce
constitutional rights. Federal attorneys followed suit. The newly
created Department of Justice and lower federal court judges
followed Congress's leadership in constitutional rights enforcement by
vigorously prosecuting Klansmen under the 1870 and 1871 Acts. All
three branches of the federal government acted on a common
understanding of the federal government's role and constitutional
power to protect the personal safety and constitutional rights of all
Americans. Federal judges uniformly upheld the constitutionality of
these statutes, exhibiting traditional judicial deference to Congress
and its primary role in interpreting the Constitution and securing
constitutional rights. Federal attorneys argued, and federal judges
held, that these statutes were constitutional because they were
enforcing and redressing violations to individuals' constitutionally
secured civil and political rights. Judges held that the Reconstruction
Amendments delegated to Congress the constitutional authority to
enact the 1870 and 1871 statutes. The Fourteenth Amendment
secured substantive fundamental rights, such as the First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech and assembly, the right to life itself, and
the Fifteenth Amendment secured the right to vote without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
160. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal
Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876, at 4-13, 135-43 (1985).
Benjamin H. Bristow became the first Solicitor General of the United States. Id. at
138-39.
161. Except where otherwise noted, the following account is taken from
Kaczorowski, supra note 160.
2005] 1435
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Federal authorities were so effective in prosecuting white terrorists
during the first Grant administration that they destroyed the Klan and
believed they were on the verge of restoring peace even in the states
that had experienced the most widespread and virulent terrorism.
Federal attorneys and marshals reported that the Presidential election
of 1872 was extraordinary for its absence of violence. The relatively
peaceful election contributed to President Grant's decision to adopt a
policy of leniency toward the arrested and convicted Klansmen in
return for promises from southern Democratic leaders to respect the
rights of black Americans and to eschew political violence. Grant's
attorney general gradually began to implement this policy just after
the 1872 election, first in South Carolina and then throughout the
South, against the wishes of the United States Attorneys in the
southern states. The Grant administration directed federal attorneys
to stop prosecuting civil rights violations during the spring and
summer of 1873.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
It was at this point that the Supreme Court handed down its initial
interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments. 16 2 It was also at
this time that the Court changed its traditional policy of deference to
Congress and became more activist in its review of federal statutes
and in its interpretation of the Constitution. The Court's decisions in
these cases violated Justice Story's rule of judicial interpretation,
which prohibited the Court from construing a clause of the
Constitution in a way that defeated its "obvious ends, when another
construction, equally accordant with the words and sense thereof, will
enforce and protect them." '163 The Court diminished the scope of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' guarantees of fundamental
rights, of Congress's power to enforce the rights they secured, and of
Congress's power to remedy their violation. These cases are well
known and do not need to be recounted here.1"
More noteworthy is that, in these cases, the Chase and Waite
Courts interpreted the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Congress's power to enforce them, more narrowly
than the Taney Court interpreted the constitutional guarantees of the
Fugitive Slave Clause and Congress's power to enforce them.1 65 The
texts of the Fugitive Slave Clause and of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment are similar. Both constitutional provisions
explicitly prohibit the states from interfering with the rights they
162. See infra note 164.
163. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842).
164. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
165. Compare cases cited supra note 164, with Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 539.
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secure. The Taney Court interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause's
prohibition against state action as an affirmative guarantee of an
absolute property right of slave owners. Although the Fugitive Slave
Clause did not expressly delegate enforcement power to Congress, the
Taney Court held that the constitutional guarantee of this right
delegated plenary power to Congress to enforce it. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did expressly delegate to Congress authority
to enforce its constitutional guarantees. Yet, the Court, under Chief
Justices Salmon P. Chase and Morrison R. Waite, refused to interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions against state action as
affirmative guarantees of absolute rights. To the contrary, it
eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, held that protection
of fundamental rights is within the state's exclusive police powers, and
restricted Congress's remedial powers to enforce whatever rights the
Fourteenth Amendment secures to violations committed by the states.
These rulings are contradicted by the expressed intentions of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. They insisted that Congress
possessed at least as much power to enforce the rights of free men as
it had had to enforce the property right of slave owners, and they
amended the Constitution to ensure that it delegated this plenary
power to Congress.166 Yet, the United States Supreme Court refused
to recognize that Congress had such legislative authority. Conceding
that it was not giving to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
its obvious meaning, the Court undermined the justice-seeking and
rights-protecting Constitution when it refused to conform to the
Court's duty to interpret the Constitution in the manner that "shall
fully and completely effectuate the whole objects of it. '167 Even the
Warren Court, which greatly expanded constitutional protections of
individual rights, did not extend constitutional protections as far as the
Reconstruction Congresses. The Court thus created a moral anomaly
in the American system of constitutional law.
The Rehnquist Court recently reaffirmed the state action limitation
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus revivified this moral
anomaly. 16 And it expanded the Court's earlier curtailment of federal
protections of individual rights that Congress had enacted. The Court
struck down the remedial provisions of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA") 169 and the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA")170 on the theory that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to withhold from Congress the power to
166. See Kaczorowski, supra note 101, at 205-30; Kaczorowski, supra note 126.
167. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612; see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
77-78.
168. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b) (2000).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
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enforce substantive rights, restricting Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment remedial powers to state action. Yet, the kind of civil
remedies these statutes adopted are comparable to the civil remedies
the Second and Fifty-First Congresses adopted to enforce slave
owners' rights. The RFRA and VAWA remedies are also
comparable to the remedies the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment themselves enacted to vindicate the constitutional rights
of American citizens."' The Rehnquist Court also concluded that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that the Supreme
Court, and not Congress, should determine what rights the Fourteenth
Amendment secures and what constitutes violations of these rights.'
But, again, when they enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment defined some of the rights the
Constitution secures to all Americans, determined what constitutes
violations of these rights, and provided civil remedies against anyone
who violated another's civil rights. Moreover, they expressly
delegated to Congress constitutional authority to exercise these
powers in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This history demonstrates that the Supreme Court curtailed
constitutional and legislative protections of constitutional rights that
Reconstruction Congresses adopted and the Department of Justice
and lower federal courts enforced after the Civil War. It would
appear, therefore, that the popularly elected branches of the federal
government were more faithful to a justice-seeking constitutionalism
than was the Supreme Court. This history of constitutional practice is
inconsistent with Sager's portrayal.'73 Contrary to Sager's theory,
history suggests that Congress may be more reliable in bringing about
the "justice-seeking account" of constitutional practice than the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, this history also shows that the
Supreme Court, from its initial decisions in the 1870s, has exercised
final authority in interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments. This
suggests that Kramer's "popular constitutionalism"'174  may be
overstated. Nevertheless, Kramer's theory of constitutionalism is
consistent with that of the Supreme Court and of the nation's
constitutional practice from the founding through the Civil War. Had
the Supreme Court continued to adhere to the constitutional theories
of the Marshall and Taney courts as recounted in this Essay, it would
have affirmed Congress's plenary power to secure fundamental rights
under the Reconstruction Amendments as their Congressional
framers intended and exercised it. Thus, the Court would have
averted the moral anomaly it created by its judicial activism since the
Civil War, as well as its judicial supremacy today.
171. See Kaczorowski, supra note 126.
172. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-22.
173. See supra notes 3-23 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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